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Criminology and Psychiatry are sister sciences which are hardly
to be separated. Both deal with conduct which deviates from the nor-
mal or average conduct of the community. In both cases this abnormal
conduct is or may become a public menace, and in both cases individuals
exhibiting such conduct may require to be temporarily or permanently
isolated from society for the latter's good; we should also be able to.
say for the good of all concerned, since our avowed goal for the crim-
inal is reclamation just as for the mental patient, restoration.
In the course of the discussion I should like to draw certain com-
parisons, indicating how psychiatry has proceeded for a considerable
distance along a path upon which criminology has only more recently
set out; and how each science may profitably partake of the experience
of the other, criminology rightly claiming the benefit of the longer
experience of her sister science along the particular course she has
pursued.
In all human relationships there is inherent the notion of Responsi-
bility. We speak of the developing responsibility of the child, of the
impaired or abolished responsibility of the mental patient, and in the
case of the criminal the issue of responsibility has ever been paramount.
There is perhaps no word which we use more glibly, more unthink-
ingly, more dogmatically, -aye, more cruelly, than the word "responsi-
bility."
Can it be defined? According to the Standard Dictionary it is
the state of being answerable or accountable legally or morally; hav-
ing sufficient mental capacity to understand and perceive the distinc-
tions of right and wrong; having sufficient moral discrimination to be
legally answerable for one's conduct. Mercier's concise definition of
criminal responsibility is: "Rightly liable to punishment." Such def-
initions are clear enough as statements but they do not give us the
true inwardness of the matter, and it is desirable to consider the es-
sential vagueness behind the apparent clarity.
To say that to be responsible is to be answerable or accountable
is merely to resort to synonyms. Mercier frankly concedes the in-
-Read at the Fifty-Ninth annual congress of the American Prison Associa-
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definiteness of his definition when he explains that "rightly" liable
simply means in accordance with "the body of opinion as to what is
right and wrong now prevalent in my own country and generation."
And this quality of responsibility has been assumed to be some-
thing which in some curious way appears at a given age. As young
children are obviously incompetent as compared with adults, the statutes
arbitrarily decide that under the age of 7, children are irresponsible
and cannot be held accountable for their acts. After 7 they may be
regarded as responsible, although provision is made for doubt up to
the age of 14. But after the latter age the child is legally answerable
for his deeds. In certain States the age of irresponsibility has been
raised from 7 to 10 years or even higher. Thus it may be merely
a matter of geography whether a given child who has killed a play-
mate is criminally liable. Such arbitrary decisions of age limits at
which the attribute of responsibility suddenly appears, utterly fail to
take into account the manner in which the processes of integration are
going forward in the individual child's mind to make for wholesome
or unwholesome reactions to his environment.
In the definitions quoted the dilemma of responsibility has two
horns as all dilemmas should, in this case an ethical and a legal one;
on one side the ability to distinguish between right and wrong-moral
discrimination; on the other, legal accountability-competency to make
one's conduct conform to certain standards established by law. Un-
fortunately these two horns are not strictly mates. Legal values and
ethical values may coincide but by no means necessarily do. As Warden
Lawes recently remarked, one can break six of the ten commandments
and commit no crime. Likewise there are certain statutes the violation
of which does not as a matter of course imply moral turpitude. One
of the strongest executive arms in the American Government is still
trying to dissuade the citizenry from that viewpoint.
In principle the objectives of law and ethics are the same, as we
should expect from their common lineage. Law is but the outgrowth
of morals (mores), just as morals are only customs crowned with the
halo of time--the habitual practices of the majority through succeed-
ing generations in a community of social beings.
Responsibility then is an attribute- of man as a social agent and
concerns his relations to other social beings. It loses most of its mean-
ing when we attempt to consider him as an isolated personality with-
out contact with his fellows. And in this relationship the traditional
"right and wrong" continually crops up. This does not make for
definiteness in our thinking about responsibility for we have no ultimate
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test of right and wrong. They are merely relative ideas, changing,
even reversing, from social level to social level, from generation to
generation, from country to country. Absolute right or absolute wrong
are abstiactions which convey no meaning.
There is a commandment which says "Thou shalt not kill." We
infer that it is wrong to kill. But when is it wrong to kill? It is
easy to picture a murder as a vicious and criminal act. In another
case with altered circumstances killing becomes a natural and defensible
act; in another it may be extolled as a praiseworthy deed; and in still
another it is enjoined as an inevitable duty. We read of certain states
of society where it is considered proper to kill off the crippled, the
aged, the incurably sick. There is precedent among primitive people
for the head of the house to dispose of the lives of members of his
own family. Moreover, human sacrifice has been a regular observance
in many religions scattered over the face of the earth.
The mere act of killing then is not necessarily wrong. It all
depends. It becomes wrong or criminal only under given circumstances
which must be precisely defined, and in the end we are reduced to
the formula of Mr. Darrow that "it is wrong to kill when it is wrong
to kill." But our conventional test of responsibility requires that the
individual shall be able. to discriminate between right and wrong, al-
though to define finally and permanently these opposite terms is as
impossible as it is to personify them.
The legal horn of the dilemma is hardly more satisfactory to deal
with. For even the law changes, more slowly than customs and morals,
but none the less surely. The lawful act of yesterday becomes today
by the affixing of a signature to a piece of paper, a crime; and by a
similar process the crime of today may become the virtue of tomorrow.
And it is with reference to these changing vAlues of right and wrong,
permissible and not permissible, legal and illegal that we are called
upon to determine the question of responsibility.
But this is not the worst. The foregoing considerations have had
to do merely with such standards as we have by which conduct is to
be gauged; and these standards as everybody knows are uncertain
enough. They represent in a sense the objective side of the inquiry.
But when we come to investigate the subjective side, the personality
and state of mind' of the person whose conduct we are studying we
are on infinitely more precarious ground. The important thing, ob-
viously, is not so much what we think of a given individual's responsi-
bility, as what that quality of responsibility signifies in his own con-
sciousness, and this is the thing in most cases almost or quite im-
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possible to determine with any degree of accuracy. Not only so, but
the concept of responsibility, which is behind all social relationships,
varies considerably in different indivduals even under the ordinary
conditions of everyday life. It varies with age, with conditions of
physical health, with educational, cultural, economic and various en-
vironmental circumstances. We have only to consider the wide differ-
ences in the sense of seriousness with which various so-called normal
people look upon minor irregularities in their daily conduct. At one
extreme we have the individual whose conscience works overtime, who
is so weighed down by scruples that initiative is almost paralyzed and
who endeavors, nay feels compelled by his over-developed conscien-
tiousness to tread an almost literal chalk line. Such a person not
only does not commit crime, but he does not allow himself what the
majority of people feel to be normal latitude of action, and when his
scruples reach the point of obsession he becomes a mental patient.
At the other extreme we have the type of personality which does
not take life seriously enough. Such an individual resorts to all kinds
of indirection and short-cuts not strictly orthodox in his dealings with
others; he may in fact cleverly develop the faculty for. circumventing
rules and regulations, even statutes, for his own advantage. It may
be merely a matter of accident or environment whether a person of
this kind lives out his life as an apparently law-abiding citizen or passes
to the ranks of the professional criminal. The daily press constantly
reminds us that the successful and respected business man of today
may tomorrow be stamped as a criminal; but are we to assume that
any actual change has taken place in the nature of the individual and
in his habits of thought and action?
The farther we pursue the phantom of responsibility the more
devious and uncertain is the path. The law endeavors to attain some
precision of meaning when it insists upon the item of criminal intent.
This leads to mere philosophizing on the doctrine of free will. It
seeks to show that the criminal as a free agent, knowing the difference
between right and wrong, has deliberately chosen the wrong. But to
establish criminal intent it is not enough to know what impression
the words and acts of the accused have made upon witnesses; it is
necessary to know what was the actual state of consciousness of the
accused himself. Moreover, the inquiry unfortusately always has to
be directed to a state of affairs in the past, to the mental status of the
accused at the time of and preceding the crime, since which a shorter
or longer interval has elapsed; so that we are not dealing with present
reactions which may be directly observed but must be satisfied to re-
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construct past reactions, to call up the image of a moment in the past
which was experienced only by the principal in the action and which
is now vanished forever.
In short, as we scrutinize the quality of responsibility from one
angle to another, and the more we aim at greater precision, the more
hopelessly we become involved in guesswork. We are saved from
discouragement, however, by some of the contemporary trends in crim-
inology. For this purpose we must draw upon the experience of psy-
chiatry.
It is not so long ago that persons called insane were dealt with
very much as were criminals. The two classes were indeed housed
together. Even in contemporary legal procedure we find faint echoes
of that period. But psychiatry as one of the medical sciences was
bound to follow the scientific method. The mental patient had to be
translated from the "case" performing unaccountable acts to an individ-
ual personality to be investigated. His conduct was made up of re-
actions, the motives of which must be sought in inheritance and original
endowment, in the training, experiences and habits of early life and
the multiplicity of living conditions surrounding his whole career.
Without information on all of these matters the conduct of the mental
patient is incomprehensible. But this is only asserting a truism which
applies to the daily acts of every individual. Psychology dealing with
normal conduct and psychiatry with abnormal follow similar lines of
investigation. And it is this path upon which modern criminology
is setting out.
The study of criminology might well be introduced by a perusal
of Dostoyefsky's masterpiece "Crime and Punishment" (1866). Writ-
ten by a man who had himself served years in penal servitude, asso-
ciated with all types of criminals and who knew the mind of the out-
cast as few men have done, this sombre Russian novel opens to our
view something of that subjective element without a just appraisal
of which the concept of responsibility, even as a legal term, can have
no meaning at all. Dostoyefsky's criminology is based on the dual
attitude of compassion and comprehension. It is the first of these,
namely compassion toward the criminal which arms the critics of
modern criminology with one of their strongest weapons. We still
hear much objection, wholesome enough too, to the so-called senti-
mental attitude toward criminals; and while it is not necessary if we
do not cho6se to follow Dostoyefsky in loving the criminal it is all
the more imperative to concentrate upon understanding him.
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To understand him we require all the data that sufficiently pro-
longed observation under scientific conditions can afford. Above all
we require the cooperation of the criminal himself in supplying this
information.
It is at this point that psychiatric and criminal procedure have
hitherto generally parted company, not alone because of the set formulae
of the legal inquiry, but also because of the universal social reaction of
hostility to the criminal. Common judicial procedure does not favor
self-expression and self-revelation on the part of the man accused
of crime, but just the reverse. By his act he has set himself apart
.and society is his enemy. Is this reaction inevitable or desirable?
Is it defensible for society to continue to yield to this somewhat primi-
tive sort of reaction? We recall that even within the last century
the public attitude toward those who were called insane was very
much the same. There were those psychiatrists who deliberately taught
that mental disease was evidence of moral perversion, which practically
amounted to saying that the deranged individual had through voluntary
wickedness brought his infirmity upon himself, and that he was getting
his just desserts. Such an attitude naturally precluded overmuch of
sympathy, and it is not difficult to understand that sternly repressive
measures, even severe physical punishment was the common lot of
both the insane man and the criminal.
In the realm of mental medicine these unwholesome prejudices
have largely been overcome, and today the mental patient is treated
with the sympathy and understanding which Dostoyefsky in his time
bespoke for the criminal as well. It is one of the most significant
departures of contemporary criminology that confidence and coopera-
tion of the criminal are invited in the scientific study of his case; that
an attempt is made to show him that his own welfare and that of so-
ciety should not and do not necessarily aim in opposite directions;
that society has no purpose and no wish to inflict suffering upon him
merely as vengeance or retaliation; that treatment designed to promote
his own welfare must include punishment or penalties also insofar
as the equal demands of the public welfare require.
By this shift of viewpoint we find that we are no longer lur-
suing the visionary something called responsibility; rather we are seek-
ing motives to conduct, whether that conduct be normal or abnormal,
vicious or virtuous, criminal or lawful; and we become aware that
the same kind of measuring stick must be used whether we are deal-
ing with normals, insane persons or criminals. In psychiatry this
method endeavors to get at the real springs of conduct in place of
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hypothetical motives; and it happily advances a long way in the ex-
planation of disordered behavior which before seemed so bizarre and
unaccountable. It offers guides to a logical series of events where
before appeared only misjudgment and confusion. And this knowledge
is the light on the path of treatment along which sick people are as-
sisted toward recovery.
From this viewpoint the idea of responsibility has all but vanished.
Ultimately the problem is one of stimulus and response, a biological
problem. The fact that the criminal is a menace to society does not
alter the methods of investigation. The mental patient likewise is
often a menace to society and under proper treatment he will not be
released as long as he continues to be a menace.
Let it not be thought that in stressing the idea of treatment for
criminals and in discounting the idea of responsibility, there is any
intention of placing the insane and the criminal on the same footing
or of unduly minimizing the place of punishment in the treatment
scheme.
Punishment is the converse of reward, and the twin concepts-
reward and punishment-are fundamental in all human actions and
relations. It is not unfair to say that all individual endeavor is di-
rected to the attainment of reward and the avoidance of penalty. In
their proper setting, however, reward and penalty alike are only natural
consequences of opposite kinds of action. In the penalties of nature
there is nothing of passion or vengeance, but only the inevitable suc-
cession of cause and effect sequences.
It is in some such way that modem criminology conceives of
punishment. It is a matter of cause and effect. The individual can-
not isolate himself from society; he is a part of it. If his act is in-
jurious to the group its reaction strikes home to him as well. It in-
fallibly follows that the kind of punishment meted out to the criminal
which will best serve the interests of society, is that which carries the
penalty only to the length required for the public safety and welfare.
The suspicion one sometimes hears expressed that the psychiatric
viewpoint in criminology would tend to regard all criminals as mental
cases is by no means justified, even though we fairly speak of crime
as a social malady. But the statute holds every man sane until the
contrary is proved; and this applies to criminals and law-abiders alike.
In medicine it goes without saying that satisfactory treatment
cannot be given without full knowledge of the nature of the disease
and its causes. In the years before the insane were regarded as sick
persons they were punished, and severely punished. The result was
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"Bedlam." Today in dealing with mental disabilities the same prin-
ciples of therapeutics apply as in other branches of medicine. Bed-
lam has disappeared, and in the wards of mental hospitals the recovery
rate compares favorably with that in internal medicine. These facts
are sign-posts along the way that criminology must proceed. It has
nothing to lose and everything to gain by relegating to the background
its preoccupation with the outworn philosophic concept of responsi-
bility, frankly substituting the scientific concept of etiology which
alone can point the way to dealing rationally with crime.
In taking this new step criminology breaches the gap long since
closed in psychiatry. What is true of the sane and insane is likewise
true of criminal and law-abider-all are brothers under the skin.
